

# Lecture 8: New Keynesian Model Part II

## Price Stickiness

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# Roadmap

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Calvo Model
- 3 Rotemberg Model
- 4 Comparing the Two Models
- 5 Conclusion

# Motivation

- Last time we studied monopolistic competition in a static framework.
- If we were to extend this basic setup into a dynamic setting, (without including any other frictions), firms would adjust their prices each period.
- Now let's explore what happens when firms can no longer perfectly adjust their prices.



# This Lecture

- We'll study two standard ways of capturing price rigidities.
  - (1) Calvo price stickiness,
  - (2) Rotemberg price stickiness.

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# Setup

- Reduced-form way of capturing price rigidities.
- Each period, a given firm has probability of  $\theta$  that they will have the same price as last period.
- Complementary probability  $1 - \theta$  that they will be able to update their price.
- Green light for adjustment known colloquially as “receiving a visit from the Calvo fairy”.
- Calvo (1983), “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximising Framework”, *Journal of Monetary Economics*.

## Law of Motion for the Price Level

- Firms in the model who update will all choose the same optimal price. Why?
- Denote the optimal price by  $P_t^*$ .
- Recall the aggregate price index from the last lecture. Denote the set of firms, who keep the same price as last period, as  $S(t) \subset [0, 1]$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_t &= \left( \int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\
 &= \left( \int_{S(t)} P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj + \int_{S(t)'} P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\
 &= [\theta(P_{t-1})^{1-\epsilon} + (1-\theta)(P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon}]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}
 \end{aligned}$$

- What is  $P_t^*$ ?

## Firm Objective

- Recall from last lecture that the firm objective was to simply maximise static profits.
- In a dynamic context without price rigidities, the objective is the same. Why?
- With price stickiness, we need to form some expectation over future profits though.
- In this dynamic context, assume productivity follows the process

$$\log(A_t) = \rho \log(A_{t-1}) + \epsilon_{a,t}, \quad \epsilon_{a,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_a^2)$$



# Firm Objective

- The firm aims to maximise the **discounted value of expected future profits**.
- Need to take account of how the choice of optimal price today will impact profits in the future, conditional on being getting a sequence of red lights.
- What are the essential ingredients to calculating this object?
- Think of NPV analysis used in corporate finance/business classes to find the market value of a sequence of cash flows. We need to know:
  - The cash flow values for each period,
  - The appropriate discount factor.

## Firm Objective

- In this case, the cash flows each period are the profits of the firm **conditional** on having the optimal price chosen at  $t$ .
- The discount factor is supposed to represent the opportunity cost of funds used in the project.
  - The relevant agents to consider are the owners of the equity in the firm: the households here in this model.
  - Recall the consumption Euler equation for the households in the MIU model

$$q_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \beta \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} (1) \right]$$

where 1 was the nominal payoff of the bond and  $q_t$  was its price.

- The object  $\beta \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}$  is referred to as the one period ahead nominal **stochastic discount factor** for the household.

## Firm Objective

- The value of the profits given the choice of  $P_t^*$  is found by discounting the  $k$  period ahead profits of the firm using the  $k$  period stochastic discount factor.
- Expected discounted profits

$$\begin{aligned}\Gamma_t(j) &= Q_{t \rightarrow t} V_{t,t}(j) + \theta \mathbb{E}_t[Q_{t \rightarrow t+1} V_{t,t+1}(j)] + \theta^2 \mathbb{E}_t[Q_{t \rightarrow t+2} V_{t,t+2}(j)] + \dots \\ &= \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k Q_{t \rightarrow t+k} V_{t,t+k}(j) \right\}\end{aligned}$$

where  $V_{t,t+k}(j)$  is profit at  $t+k$  with price chosen at  $t$  and  $Q_{t \rightarrow t+k}$  is the  $k$  period ahead stochastic discount factor

$$Q_{t \rightarrow t+k} = \beta^k \left( \frac{C_{t+k}}{C_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}}$$

## $k$ Period Ahead Profits

- What is the expression for  $V_{t,t+k}(j)$ ?
- Firm faces demand curve at period  $t + k$  given the optimal price set at  $t$

$$Y_{t,t+k}(j) = \left( \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_{t+k}$$

where  $Y_{t,t+k}(j)$  denotes the demand for the firm's variety at  $t + k$  given the price set at  $t$  and  $Y_{t+k}$  is aggregate supply at  $t + k$ .

## $k$ Period Ahead Profits

- Can then write  $V_{t,t+k}(j)$  as

$$V_{t,t+k}(j) = P_t^* Y_{t,t+k}(j) - TC_{t+k}(Y_{t,t+k}(j))$$

where  $TC_{t,t+k}(Y_{t,t+k}(j))$  is the total cost at  $t + k$ .

# Optimal Price

- FOC

$$\frac{\partial \Gamma_t(j)}{\partial P_t^*} = 0 \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k Q_{t \rightarrow t+k} \frac{\partial V_{t,t+k}(j)}{\partial P_t^*} \right\} = 0$$

where

$$\frac{\partial V_{t,t+k}(j)}{\partial P_t^*} = Y_{t,t+k}(j) \left[ (1 - \epsilon) + \epsilon \frac{1}{P_t^*} TC'_{t+k}(Y_{t,t+k}(j)) \right]$$

## Where to From Here?

- This FOC forms the basis for what's known as the new Keynesian Phillips curve.
- It's traditionally linearised: we'll do this next lecture.

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# Setup

- This model assumes that firms can always opt to change their price, but doing so involves paying a quadratic adjustment cost of the form

$$AC_t(j) = \frac{\lambda}{2} \left( \frac{\tilde{P}_t^*}{\tilde{P}_{t-1}^*} - 1 \right)^2 Y_t$$

where  $\lambda > 0$  captures the degree of price stickiness and  $\tilde{P}_t^*$  denotes the optimal reset price.

- Rotemberg (1982), "Sticky Prices in the United States", *Journal of Political Economy*.

## Firm Objective

- Again, firm seeks to maximise the discounted expected value of future profits for its shareholders

$$\tilde{\Gamma}_t(j) = \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} Q_{t \rightarrow t+k} \tilde{V}_{t+k}(j) \right\}$$

where

$$\tilde{V}_{t+k}(j) = \tilde{P}_t^* Y_{t+k}(j) - TC_{t+k}(Y_{t+k}(j)) - P_{t+k} AC_{t+k}(j)$$

and

$$Y_{t+k}(j) = \left( \frac{\tilde{P}_t^*}{P_{t+k}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_{t+k}$$

- Why am I multiplying the adjustment cost by the price index?

# Optimal Price

- FOC

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{\Gamma}_t(j)}{\partial \tilde{P}_t^*} = 0 \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} Q_{t \rightarrow t+k} \frac{\partial \tilde{V}_{t+k}(j)}{\partial \tilde{P}_t^*} \right\} = 0$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \tilde{V}_t(j)}{\partial \tilde{P}_t^*} &= Y_t(j) + \tilde{P}_t^* \frac{\partial Y_t(j)}{\partial \tilde{P}_t^*} + TC'_t(Y_t(j)) \frac{\partial Y_t(j)}{\partial \tilde{P}_t^*} - \\ &\quad \lambda \left( \frac{\tilde{P}_t^*}{\tilde{P}_{t-1}^*} - 1 \right) Y_t \frac{\tilde{P}_t^*}{\tilde{P}_{t-1}^*} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{V}_{t+1}(j)}{\partial \tilde{P}_t^*} &= \lambda \frac{\tilde{P}_{t+1}^*}{(\tilde{P}_t^*)^2} \left( \frac{\tilde{P}_{t+1}^*}{\tilde{P}_t^*} - 1 \right) P_{t+1} Y_{t+1} \end{aligned}$$

# Optimal Price

- Putting it all together yields (exercise: check)

$$\begin{aligned} & \left( \frac{(\tilde{P}_t^*)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t - \frac{\tilde{P}_t^*}{P_t} \epsilon \left( \frac{(\tilde{P}_t^*)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon-1} Y_t + TC'_t(Y_t(j)) \epsilon \left( \frac{(\tilde{P}_t^*)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon-1} Y_t \frac{1}{P_t} - \\ & \lambda \left( \frac{(\tilde{P}_t^*)}{(\tilde{P}_{t-1}^*)} - 1 \right) \frac{Y_t P_t}{(\tilde{P}_{t-1}^*)} + \lambda \mathbb{E}_t \left[ Q_{t \rightarrow t+1} \frac{(\tilde{P}_{t+1}^*)}{(\tilde{P}_t^*)^2} \left( \frac{(\tilde{P}_{t+1}^*)}{(\tilde{P}_t^*)} - 1 \right) Y_{t+1} P_{t+1} \right] \\ & = 0 \end{aligned}$$

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# Cross-Sectional Price Dispersion

- Rotemberg: none. Why?
- Calvo: **in general**, there will be dispersion. E.g. consider initial price index  $P_0$ .

$$\Rightarrow P_1 = [\theta(P_0)^{1-\epsilon} + (1-\theta)(P_1^*)^{1-\epsilon}]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow P_2 &= [\theta\{\theta(P_0)^{1-\epsilon} + (1-\theta)(P_1^*)^{1-\epsilon}\} + (1-\theta)(P_2^*)^{1-\epsilon}]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\ &= [\theta^2(P_0)^{1-\epsilon} + \theta(1-\theta)(P_1^*)^{1-\epsilon} + (1-\theta)(P_2^*)^{1-\epsilon}]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow P_3 = [\theta^3(P_0)^{1-\epsilon} + \theta^2(1-\theta)(P_1^*)^{1-\epsilon} + \theta(1-\theta)(P_2^*)^{1-\epsilon} + (1-\theta)(P_3^*)^{1-\epsilon}]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

and so on.

## Induced Distortions

- Adjustment costs in Rotemberg are **goods** that come out of the resource constraint

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_t &= C_t + \int_0^1 AC_t(j) dj \\
 &= C_t + \int_0^1 \frac{\lambda}{2} \left( \frac{(\tilde{P}_t^*)}{(\tilde{P}_{t-1}^*)} - 1 \right)^2 Y_t dj \\
 &= C_t + Y_t \frac{\lambda}{2} \int_0^1 \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 dj \\
 &= C_t + Y_t \frac{\lambda}{2} \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 \\
 \Rightarrow Y_t &= \left\{ 1 - \frac{\lambda}{2} \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 \right\}^{-1} C_t
 \end{aligned}$$

i.e. there is an “inefficiency wedge” between output and consumption.

## Induced Distortions

- Under the **Calvo** model, price dispersion creates distortions.
- Recall from the production function that

$$Y_t(j) = A_t N_t(j)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$\Rightarrow N_t(j) = \left( \frac{Y_t(j)}{A_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

Which is labour demand for firm  $j$ . Aggregation gives

$$N_t = \int_0^1 N_t(j) dj = \int_0^1 \left( \frac{Y_t(j)}{A_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} dj$$

$$= \left( \frac{Y_t}{A_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \int_0^1 \left( \frac{(P_t^*)}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{-\epsilon}{1-\alpha}} dj$$

where the last line comes from plugging-in  $j$ 's demand function.



## Induced Distortions

- Notice that if there is perfect price flexibility, then

$$\int_0^1 \left( \frac{(P_t^*)}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{-\epsilon}{1-\alpha}} dj = \int_0^1 \left( \frac{P_t}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{-\epsilon}{1-\alpha}} dj = 1$$

- With rigidities though, see that

$$N_t^{1-\alpha} = \left( \frac{Y_t}{A_t} \right) \left\{ \int_0^1 \left( \frac{(P_t^*)}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{-\epsilon}{1-\alpha}} dj \right\}^{1-\alpha}$$

$$\Rightarrow Y_t = A_t N_t^{1-\alpha} \left\{ \int_0^1 \left( \frac{(P_t^*)}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{-\epsilon}{1-\alpha}} dj \right\}^{\alpha-1}$$

where  $\left\{ \int_0^1 \left( \frac{(P_t^*)}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{-\epsilon}{1-\alpha}} dj \right\}^{\alpha-1} < 1$ .

- You can interpret the last equality as an **aggregate** production function.

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# Takeaways

- We looked at two forms of modelling price stickiness.
- Both create distortions.
- Different sources of distortion though.