Lecture 13: New Keynesian Model Part V Fiscal Multipliers

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Roadmap



Flexible Price Multiplier

3 Sticky Price Multiplier



4 Comparison and Conclusion

Motivation

- During times of economic turmoil, often governments seek to boost activity through spending programs.
- Dates-back to the old ideas of Keynes.
- If the fiscal authority increases their expenditures by x%, how much will output increase by?
- How "effective" is fiscal policy in the economy as a stimulating tool.

Motivation

- This lecture will proceed in two steps.
- Study the impact of fiscal policy on
 - (1) Flexible price equilibrium.
 - (2) New Keynesian equilibrium.

Model Environment with Government Spending

- In this lecture, we'll assume that there are no productivity or monetary policy shocks.
- The only stochastic variable is government spending, G_t .
- Log-linearised version denoted by \hat{g}_t .
- I'll assume that there is one single process for G_t .
- All other variables will either have no superscript, (if sticky price model), or a superscript *n* if flexible price variable.

Roadmap





3 Sticky Price Multiplier



4 Comparison and Conclusion

Household Problem

Problem:

$$\max_{\{C_t^n, N_t^n, B_{t+1}^n\}_{t=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \left[\frac{(C_t^n)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{(N_t^n)^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi} \right]$$

subject to their budget constraint

$$P_t^n C_t^n + Q_t^n B_{t+1}^n \leq W_t^n B_t^n + B_t^n + D_t^n - V_t^n$$

- where V_t is a lump-sum tax that is levied by the government on the households.
- Recall that B_t^n are government bonds.

Household's Problem: Optimality

• Lagrangian given by

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\frac{(C_t^n) 1 - \sigma}{1 - \sigma} - \frac{N_t^{1+\psi}}{1 + \psi} \right] \\ + \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \lambda_t^n \left[W_t^n N_t^n + B_t^n - V_t^n - Q_t^n B_{t+1}^n - P_t^n C_t^n \right]$$

Household Optimality: First Order Conditions

FOCs:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_t^n} = 0 \Rightarrow \beta^t (C_t^n)^{-\sigma} - P_t^n \lambda_t^n = 0$$
(1)

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial N_t^n} = 0 \Rightarrow -\beta^t (N_t^n)^{\psi} + \lambda_t^n W_t^n = 0$$
⁽²⁾

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial B_{t+1}^n} = 0 \Rightarrow -Q_t^n \lambda_t^n + \mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}^n] = 0$$
(3)

• Notice that nothing changes here relative to the case without government spending.

Fiscal Authority

- We'll assume that their behaviour is exogenous.
- Fiscal policy rule of the form

$$\log(G_t) = \rho_G \log(G_{t-1}) + \epsilon_{G,t}$$

for $0 < \rho_G < 1$.

• Government budget constraint

$$B_t^n + P_t^n G_t = V_t^n + q_t^n B_{t+1}^n.$$

- Sources of funds: new borrowing from households and taxes.
- Uses of funds: repaying old borrowing and government spending.

Natural Rate of Interest

• An exogenous rate that comes from the linearised household Euler equation

$$\hat{c}_t^n = \mathbb{E}_t[\hat{c}_{t+1}^n] - \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[\hat{i}_t^n - \mathbb{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}^n \right]$$
$$\Rightarrow \hat{r}_t^n = \sigma \mathbb{E}_t[\hat{c}_{t+1}^n - \hat{c}_t^n]$$

Resource Constraint

• Government purchases now enter into the constraint

$$C_t^n + \mathbf{G}_t = Y_t^n$$

Linearised System

Household block

$$\varphi \hat{n}_t^n + \sigma \hat{c}_t^n = \hat{w}_t^n - \hat{\rho}_t^n \tag{4}$$

$$\hat{r}_t^n = \sigma \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{c}_{t+1} - \hat{c}_t^n]$$
(5)

Firm block

$$\hat{y}_{t}^{n} - \hat{n}_{t}^{n} = \hat{w}_{t}^{n} - \hat{\rho}_{t}^{n}$$
(6)
$$\hat{y}_{t}^{n} = (1 - \alpha)\hat{n}_{t}^{n}$$
(7)

Government block

$$\hat{g}_t = \rho_G \hat{g}_{t-1} + \epsilon_{G,t} \tag{8}$$

• Market clearing

$$\hat{y}_t^n = \frac{\bar{C}}{\bar{Y}}\hat{c}_t^n + \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}}\hat{g}_t$$
(9)

• Six equations in seven unknowns. What's the issue?

- Set $\hat{p}_t^n = 0$ as the numeraire.
- Substitute (4) into (6) to get

$$\varphi \hat{n}_t^n + \sigma \hat{c}_t^n = \hat{y}_t^n - \hat{n}_t^n$$

$$\Rightarrow \hat{y}_t^n = (1 + \varphi) \hat{n}_t^n + \sigma \hat{c}_t^n$$
(10)

Substitute (7) into (10) to get

$$\hat{y}_{t}^{n} = \frac{1+\varphi}{1-\alpha}\hat{y}_{t}^{n} + \sigma\hat{c}_{t}^{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow \hat{y}_{t}^{n} = -\left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\varphi+\sigma}\right)\sigma\hat{c}_{t}^{n}$$
(11)

• Then substitute (9) into (11) and re-arrange to get

$$\hat{y}_t^n = \frac{\sigma \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{C}}}{\frac{\varphi + \sigma}{1 - \alpha} + \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}}\sigma} \hat{g}_t$$

what is the coefficient?

See that

$$\frac{\partial \hat{y}_{t}^{n}}{\partial \hat{g}_{t}} = \frac{\sigma \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{C}}}{\frac{\varphi + \sigma}{1 - \alpha} + \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}}\sigma}$$

...this is an elasticity!

- What can we say about its size?
- See that

$$\begin{split} \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{C}} &= \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}}\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{C}} \\ &= \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}}\left[1 - \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}}\right]^{-1} \\ &\Rightarrow \frac{\sigma\frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{C}}}{\frac{\varphi + \sigma}{1 - \alpha} + \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}}\sigma} = \frac{1}{\left[\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}} - 1\right]\left\{\frac{\varphi + \sigma}{\sigma(1 - \alpha)} + \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}}\right\}} < 1, \end{split}$$

where the inequality follows from the fact that $\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}} > 1.$

• So it follows that

$$\frac{\partial \hat{y}_t^n}{\partial \hat{g}_t} < 1$$

meaning that a 1% increase in G_t will lead to a less than proportional increase in Y_t^n .

Roadmap









Motivation

- Now let's think about the model with sticky prices.
- Household FOCs will still be the same, (obviously without the *n* superscripts though).
- As will the resource constraint.
- What will the new Keynesian Phillips curve and dynamic IS curve look like?

Dynamic IS Curve

- What does the output gap look like?
- We've already characterised the flexible price equilibrium earlier.

See that

$$\hat{y}_{t}^{g} = \hat{y}_{t} - \hat{y}_{t}^{n}$$

$$= \frac{\bar{C}}{\bar{Y}}\hat{c}_{t} + \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}}\hat{g}_{t} - \frac{\sigma\frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{C}}}{\frac{\varphi+\sigma}{1-\alpha} + \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}}\sigma}\hat{g}_{t}$$

$$= \frac{\bar{C}}{\bar{Y}}\hat{c}_{t} + \Gamma\hat{g}_{t}$$
where $\Gamma = \left\{\frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}} - \frac{\sigma\frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{C}}}{\frac{\varphi+\sigma}{1-\alpha} + \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}}\sigma}\right\}.$

$$(12)$$

Dynamic IS Curve

• Now plug equation (12) into the household's Euler equation to get

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{c}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t(\hat{c}_{t+1}) - \frac{1}{\sigma} [\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t(\hat{\pi}_{t+1})] \\ \Rightarrow \hat{y}_t^g - \Gamma \hat{g}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{y}_{t+1}^g] - \Gamma \mathbb{E}_t \hat{g}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{\bar{C}}{\bar{Y}} [\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t(\hat{\pi}_{t+1})] \\ \Rightarrow \hat{y}_t^g &= \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{y}_{t+1}^g] - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}} [\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t(\hat{\pi}_{t+1}) - \hat{r}_t^n] \end{aligned}$$
where $\hat{r}_t^n = \tilde{\sigma} \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{C}} (1 - \Gamma) (1 - \rho_G) \hat{g}_t$ and $\frac{1}{\bar{\sigma}} = \frac{\bar{C}}{\bar{Y}} \frac{1}{\sigma}.$

- The natural rate of interest now depends on the fiscal policy shock.
- It didn't depend on the monetary policy shock though. What's going on?

New Keynesian Phillips Curve

- Does this change?
- No: the firms are just taking demand as exogenous anyway.

Linearised System

$$\hat{y}_t^g = \mathbb{E}_t[\hat{y}_{t+1}^g] - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}}[\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t(\hat{\pi}_{t+1}) - \hat{r}_t^n]$$
$$\hat{\pi}_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t[\hat{\pi}_{t+1}] + \kappa \hat{y}_t^g$$

$$\hat{i}_t = \phi_\pi \hat{\pi}_t + \phi_y \hat{y}_t^g$$

$$\hat{r}_t^n = \tilde{\sigma} \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{C}} (1 - \Gamma) (1 - \rho_G) \hat{g}_t$$

$$\hat{g}_t = \rho_G \hat{g}_{t-1} + \epsilon_{g,t}$$

Undetermined Coefficients

- Can we get any further?
- Conjecture that

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \gamma_{\pi g} \hat{g}_t$$
$$\hat{y}_t^g = \gamma_{yg} \hat{g}_t$$

and utilise method of undetermined coefficients.

Undetermined Coefficients

• See that the new Keynesian Phillips curve implies that

$$\gamma_{\pi g} \hat{g}_t = \beta \rho_G \gamma_{\pi g} \hat{g}_t + \kappa \gamma_{yg} \hat{g}_t$$
$$\Rightarrow \gamma_{\pi g} - \beta \rho_G \gamma_{\pi g} - \kappa \gamma_{yg} = 0$$
$$\Rightarrow \gamma_{\pi g} = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \beta \rho_G} \gamma_{yg}$$

Undetermined Coefficients

• Then the dynamic IS curve gives that (exercise: check)

$$\gamma_{yg} = \frac{\tilde{\sigma}\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{C}}(1-\Gamma)(1-\rho_G)\hat{g}_t}{\tilde{\sigma}(1-\rho_G) + \phi_y - (\rho_G - \phi_\pi)\frac{\kappa}{1-\beta\rho_G}}$$

• We can then think about what happens to the output gap with a fiscal shock.

$$\hat{y}_{t}^{g} = \frac{\tilde{\sigma}\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{C}}(1-\Gamma)(1-\rho_{G})}{\tilde{\sigma}(1-\rho_{G}) + \phi_{y} + (\phi_{\pi}-\rho_{G})\frac{\kappa}{1-\beta\rho_{G}}}\hat{g}_{t}$$
where recall $\Gamma = \left\{\frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}} - \frac{\sigma \bar{C}}{\frac{\varphi+\sigma}{1-\alpha} + \frac{\bar{Y}}{G}\sigma}\right\}.$

• Recall that we also showed in the previous section that

$$\begin{split} & \frac{\sigma \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{C}}}{\frac{\varphi+\sigma}{1-\alpha}+\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}}\sigma} < 1 \\ \Rightarrow \Gamma &= \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}} - \frac{\sigma \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{C}}}{\frac{\varphi+\sigma}{1-\alpha}+\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{G}}\sigma} < 1, \end{split}$$

which means that the output gap increases with positive fiscal shocks.

• Then gives the multiplier on output

$$\begin{split} \hat{y}_t &= \hat{y}_t^{\mathcal{G}} + \hat{y}_t^n \\ &= \left\{ \frac{\sigma(1 - \Gamma)(1 - \rho_G)}{\sigma \frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{C}}(1 - \rho_G) + \phi_y + (\phi_\pi - \rho_G) \frac{\kappa}{1 - \beta \rho_G}} + \Gamma \right\} \hat{g}_t \end{split}$$

which is clearly bigger than that under the flexible price equilibrium.

• Notice that it's also less than one though as

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\sigma(1-\Gamma)(1-\rho_{G})}{\sigma\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{C}}(1-\rho_{G})+\phi_{y}+(\phi_{\pi}-\rho_{G})\frac{\kappa}{1-\beta\rho_{G}}} = \\ \frac{(1-\Gamma)}{\frac{\bar{Y}}{\bar{C}}+\frac{\phi_{y}}{\sigma(1-\rho_{G})}+(\phi_{\pi}-\rho_{G})\frac{\kappa}{(1-\beta\rho_{G})\sigma(1-\rho_{G})}} < 1-\Gamma \end{aligned}$$

where the inequality follows from the fact that $\bar{Y}/\bar{C}>1$ and $\phi_{\pi}>1>\rho_{G}.$

Roadmap









Flexible v.s. Sticky Prices

- Multiplier is larger under sticky prices than flexible.
- Both still less than one though.
- Due to the reaction of the monetary policy rule.
- Increasing in the degree of price stickiness (higher θ reduces κ).
- Decreasing in monetary policy reactiveness.

Next Class

- Monetary policy accommodation.
- Increases the size of the multiplier: can be above one.